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I n the 25 years since the U .S. Su-preme Court first invalidated a statute containing a gender-based classification, the use of explicit 
gender distinctions in starutes has de-
creased dramatically.1 In virtually all 
contexts, the equal protection principle 
has prohibited the use of gender as a ba-
sis for differentiation. The prohibition 
against gender-based classifications was 
designed to challenge traditional sex-role 
assumptions about women, assumptions 
that reinforced women's roles as wives 
and mothers and downplayed their roles 
as wage earners. 
One prominent exception to the hos-
tility against the use of explicit gender 
distinctions is the practice of relying on 
gender-based tables to determine loss of 
furure earning capacity in personal injury 
and wrongful death actions. 
This practice dramatically reduces some 
damage awards for women, perpetuates 
and magnifies employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of a person's gender, 
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at the University of Pittsb11rgh. A longer 
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and is arguably unconstitutional on equal 
protection grounds. 
In this country, gender bias in the 
computation of these damages has large-
ly escaped the notice of the courts and 
commentators.2 I first became aware of 
it when I served as a member of a state-
wide task force examining gender and 
race bias in the Iowa court system. From 
our survey responses and informal com-
mittee discussions, we discovered that lit-
igators and judges generally accepted the 
legitimacy of economic projections made 
about the future c:arnin~ of female plain• 
tiffi even though they were based on sta-
tistics reflecting economic patterns for 
women only. 
My later research showed that it was 
not uncommon for an attorney for a 
female plaintiff to introduce gender• 
specific data, although this was likely to 
decrease the plaintiff's award. In a few 
cases, the future earning cipacity of Afiican 
American plaintiffi was cruculated by ref-
erence to explicitly race-based tables, al-
though race-based classifications are even 
more greatly disfavored in the law. 
I learned that what economists regard 
as an accurate measure of loss of future 
earning capacity has dominated how law• 
yers and judges determine these dam-
ages. There has been little discussion of 
the equity of the practice and little aware-
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ness that predictions about future earn-
ing capacity involve social as well as eco-
nomic judgments. 
Calculating Lost Potential 
An award for the loss of future earn· 
ing capacity compensates for the ability 
to earn money when an injury has im-
paired the plaintiff's earning power. Au-
thorities generally agree that these dam• 
ages compensate for loss of potential: 
what the plaintiff c011ld have earned, not 
what the plaintiff wo11ld have earned. This 
approach provides a theoretical basis for 
authorizing awards for people who do 
unpaid labor in the home or whose work 
is not otherwise compensated through 
the market. One leading commentator 
has described lost earning capacity as "an 
award for the value of the time of the in-
jured person, measured by a more or less 
objective measure." i 
The most common starting point for 
calculating lost earning capacity of an 
adult is to consider the plaintiff's estab-
lished earnin~ record. Current earnings 
are then used as a basis for projecting fu-
ture earnings. To do this, it is necessary 
to estimate how many years the plaintiff 
would have worked if she had not been 
injured (work-life expectancy) and the 
amount the plaintiff would have earned 
each year, reduced to present value. 
These calculations arc complicated 
enough to justify expert testimony on 
the issue. Typically, before trial, an econ-
omist will prepare a formal report that 
summarizes the calculations, including a 
statement of the assumptions used and 
copies of government documents pro• 
viding statistical information:1 
When a female plaintiff has an estab-
lished work history, economists often use 
gender-based tables to estimate work•lifc 
expectancy. These tables incorporate the 
assumption that women spend fewer 
years in the labor force than men. 
Work-life expectancy is distinct from 
life expectancy. Work-life expectancy is 
derived from the past working experi-
ence of all people in a person's gender 
and racial group. It incorporates rates of 
unemployment, both voluntary and in-
voluntary, as well as expected retirement 
age. Although women as a group live 
longer than men, the work-life expec-
tancy of women of all races is typically 
shorter than that of men, in part because 
in the past women spent years out of the 
workforce for childrearing and other 
family-related reasons. 
Based on data from the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics that compare work-
life patterns, the work-life expectancy for 
a white man injured at the age of 30 is 
estimated to be 29.5 years. The same es-
timate for a white woman is 20.8 years. 
Minority women arc at even a greater 
disadvantage. A minority woman injured 
at age 30 has a work-life expectancy of 
20.3 years-0.5 years less than that of a 
white woman, 9.2 years less than that of 
a white man, and 4.2 years less than that 
of a minority man. The five-year clispar-
ity between white men and minority men 
also demonstrates that both race- and 
gender-specific data penalize certain 
groups of plaintiffi in damage awards.~ 
Economists also rely on gender-based 
tables where the injured party has only 
a limited, or nonexistent, work history. 
Most of these cases involve children who 
have suffered catastrophic injury. 
One technique for calculating future 
earning capacity in these cases is to pre-
clict the level of education that the plain-
tiff would have achieved. This can be 
done by examining a number of factors, 
such as the plaintiff's scores on aptitude 
tests, the socioeconomic status of the 
plaintiff's fumily, and parents' and sib-
lings' education levels. 
Gender enters the calculation when 
economists refer to tables of average earn-
ings, broken down by sex and education, 
to estimate the plaintiff's lifetime earn-
ings. Where data are available for specif. 
ic racial groups, economists may further 
target their projections based on the 
plaintiff's race. 
Negative Consequences 
Using gender-specific data can have 
enormous negative consequences for 
plaintiffs in tort actions. The projected 
lifetime earnings, discounted to 1990 
present value, of a female college 
graduate have been estimated to be 
$1,174,772--of a male college graduate, 
Sl,815,850.6 This means that if two chil-
dren, a boy and a girl, with the same ed-
ucation prospects were each pennanent· 
Using gender-
specific data can 
have enormous 
negative 
consequences. 
ly disabled by an injury, the girl's award 
would be only 65 percent of the boy's 
award, a disparity attributable solely to 
gender. 
The size of the male-female disparity 
is not surprising given the size of the cur-
rent wage gap between men and women 
of all races. In 1991 the median income 
of white women employed full time was 
69 percent of the median income of 
white men. Afiican American women re• 
ceived 62 percent of the median income 
for white men; Hispanic women, 54 per-
cent; Afiican American men, 74 percent; 
and Hispanic men, 65 percent.7 
Relying on current wages means that 
predictions about future wages will be 
tied to present disparities. Use of these 
data also allows discrimination in one 
area-setting pay rates-to influence val-
uation in another area~alculating per-
sonal injury awards. Using current wa-
ges also further impoverishes members 
of low-income groups, most notably 
women, who find themselves disabled 
from severe injuries. 
Until as recently as seven years ago, 
courts seemed to accept the premise that 
awards to female plaintiffi could prop-
erly be based on gender-specific eco-
nomic data and estimates. A traditional-
ist line of cases approved of estimates of 
work-life expectancy for women that 
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were substantially lower than estimates 
for similarly situated men. 
One dramatic example is Frankel v. 
United States,8 which involved a woman 
injured after she had completed two years 
of a four-year course in commercial art. 
Although she was on her way to a career 
in commercial art, the court in a nonjury 
trial concluded that she would have be-
come a wife and mother, leaving the 
workforce for a substantial period of 
time.9 The projection of future earnings 
for a commercial artist working contin-
uously until retirement was $237,630. 
The plaintiff, however, was awarded on-
ly $125,000 for lost earning capacity af. 
ter the court took a hefty discount for 
marriage and motherhood.1° 
In other cases, courts have approved 
the use of statistical calculations based on 
the lower average earnings of employed 
women.11 In these cases, plaintiffs re· 
ceived lower awards than men would 
have received even though it was as-
sumed that the women would stay in the 
workforce as long as men would. 
In wrongful death cases involving chil-
dren, courts have typically instructed 
juries to consider "the age, sex, and phys-
ical and mental characteristics of the 
child .... " 12 This signals that sex is rele· 
vant as a good predictor of earning ca-
pacity. The assumption is that, all things 
being equal, female children have less 
economic worth to their parents than 
male children. The instruction perpetu• 
ates, in diluted form, old notions that 
daughters arc liabilities while sons can be 
expected to increase a family's wealth. 
Constitutional Attack 
The traditionalist approach to earn• 
ing capacity has yet to be attacked as 
unconstirutional, gender-based discrim-
ination. Two recent cases, however, 
have questioned the propriety of using 
gender- or race-based data as a matter of 
common law policy. The first is Reilly v. 
United States, 13 where the defendant in-
troduced work-life tables from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics indicating that 
women who had 15 or more years of ed-
ucation would work only 28 years be-
tween the ages of 22 and 70, a 40 per-
cent reduction from the plaintiff's figures. 
The court rejected the assumption that 
the past could be used as an accurate 
guide to the future. It characterized the 
assumption underlying the gender-based 
tables as "sexist" and "antiquated" and 
expressed doubt concerning the "the 
probative value of such a statistic with re-
spect to twenty-first century women's 
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employment patterns .... " ~ 
Reilly is notable for its recognition that 
women's work patterns are dynamic and 
that projections that do not take into ac-
count the trend toward greater labor 
force participation among women are in-
accurate and unfair. Perhaps because no 
constitutional challenge was raised, how· 
ever, Reilly stopped short of questioning 
the use of more refined gender-based sta· 
tistics that arc sensitive to employment 
trends but that nevertheless lead to dis" 
paratc results for men and women. 
The most fur-reaching case to confront 
these issues is Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. 
United States,15 a 1991 case involving the 
use of both gender- and race-based sta-
tistics. The dilemma racing the court in 
that case ,vas how to categorize the c.."arll· 
ing potential of a male child whose ra-
ther was black and whose mother was 
white. The plaintifPs expert med census 
tables to determine the income ofU.S. 
male college graduates; the defendant's 
expert argued that the appropriate mea-
sure to use was the "average earnings of 
black men .... " 1~ 
The court refused to decide the child's 
race and rejected statistics premised ex-
plicitly on gender or race. The court 
ruled that only gender-neutral and race· 
neutral data should be used. It based its 
calculation on the average earnings of all 
U.S. college graduates, without regard 
to sex or race. 
The result was swprising. Because the 
average wage for all people was below 
that of both white and black men, the 
plaintiff recovered less than even the 
amount argued for by the defendant. The 
court took a neutral, inclusive approach 
that caused the plaintiff to lose the size-
able privilege typically accorded to male 
plaintiffs, even though he prevailed in his 
argument that race-specific tables unfuirly 
decreased awards to blacks. 
I believe the inclusive approach used 
by the Tnrpeh-Doe court is constitution· 
ally mandated.11 On the merits, the case 
against using gender-based classifications 
is very strong. Under the prevailing in-
tennediate scrutiny standard for explicit 
gender-based classifications, women are 
supposed to be protected against dam• 
aging generalizations about their sex un-
less the state proves that the classification 
is substantially related to the achit.-vemcnt 
of an important government objectivc.18 
Using this test, the U.S . Supreme 
Court has struck down a number of stat-
utes that presumed wives were econom-
ically dependent on their husbands and 
that conditioned financial benefits on a 
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spouse's sex. 19 The Court steadfustly re-
fused to allow gender to be used as a ba-
sis for assuming dependency, despite 
strong statistical evidence that most wives 
were, in fact, financially dependent on 
their husbands. 
The Court's approach in equal pro-
tection cases rejects overbroad general-
izations and provides legal support for 
women in nontraditional roles. The 
Court has shown its distaste for the very 
domestic and maternal assumptions un-
derlying the calculation of women's fu-
ture earning capacity-that women will 
become stay-at-home mothers and that 
when they do work, they will have less-
demanding and lower-paying jobs out-
side the home. 
Use of gender-based statistics to pro• 
ject future earning capacity closely re-
sembles the economic dependency pre• 
sumptions invalidated by the Court in 
the 1970s. In each situation, the gender-
based classification is a generalization 
based _on women's historical lack of earn-
ing power and represents an attempt to 
bind individuals to the experience of a 
group. The Court's reluctance to uphold 
classifications that might disadvantage 
women in their nontraditional roles as 
wage earners should carry over to use of 
sex-based earnings projections. 
Plaintiffs might also rely on the cele-
brated Title VII case of City of Los An· 
ge/es v. Mnnhart29 when raising a con• 
stitutional challenge to gender-based 
estimates of work-life expectancy. Man-
hart held that an employer could not re-
qui re women to make larger contribu-
tions to a pension fund simply because 
as a group they live longer than men. 21 
Even though the generalization that 
women have longer life expectancies was 
accurate, the Court concluded that the 
insurance scheme violated antidiscrimi-
nation principles because of its tenden • 
cy .. to preserve traditional assumptions 
about groups rather than thoughtful 
scrutiny ofindividuals."11 Although Man· 
hart was not a constitutional challenge, 
its concern for individualized equity is a 
strong theme in constitutional jurispru· 
dence and provides powerful support for 
an equal protection challenge. 
An even stronger challenge can be 
made against use of race-based statistics 
that leave minority women and men at 
a distinct disadvantage. Explicit race-
based classifications are treated as inher-
ently suspect and can only be justified in 
the most compelling of circumstances. 
The most damning precedent can be 
found in Palmore v. Sidoti, 13 which held 
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So ... You want to sue a defendant 
in a foreign country?? 
Call one of the lawyers in our Foreign Department 800-328-7171 
Caveat: The technical requirements of aervlce outside the United States can Involve 
costs, delays, and pitfalls gro11ly disproportionate to the basic purpose of service. 
And the recent Schlunk Case is more a landmine than a landmark, which could easily 
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1. There are a number of countries which 
consider service of process (even by 
mail) within their borders a Judicial act 
under their sovereign Jurisdiction. Such 
countries as the Federal Republic of 
Germany (W. Germany) Japan, Italy, 
Yugoslavia, and Switzerland prohibit, 
and have penal sanctions against 
service of clvtl processs which ls not 
made In strict accordance to their clvll 
codes, (even on U.S. citizens abroad). 
Inadequate seJVlce could create some 
real problems. For example, after 
Judgement In a U.S. Court, the plalntiff 
could encounter foreign penal 
sanctions when he attempts to obtain 
Jurisdiction over foreign assets. Or, the 
U.S. Judgement could be Inoperative 
because of failure to meet foreign 
requirements. and cure could be 
Impossible If the foreign statute of 
limitations has run. 
2. SeJVlce of Process abroad can take as 
little as one week to as long as 18 
months. The time varies from country to 
country depending on the method 
required to make proper service. The 
average time Is 6-8 weeks. 
3. Most lndustrlaltzed nations require that 
documents seJVed In their countries be 
translated Into their native language. A 
unique example Is Switzerland (there Is 
no "Swiss" language). It requires that 
documents be translated into either 
French, German, or Italian depending 
on the address of the defendanL 
4. Letters Rogatory are a request by the 
Judge of the U.S. court where the action 
Is venued, to the highest Judicial 
authority of the defendant's homeland, 
seeking Judicial assistance for service of 
process. A specific format, (with 
tranlatlons of the letters and pleadings), 
plus authentications, acknowledgements 
and foreign embassy seals are generally 
required. Letters Rogatory are required 
to effect formal service when there Is no 
International treaty prescribing a 
different method. 
5. Service by mail on a defendant In a 
foreign country seldom works, and Is 
never a good ldea. The latent hazards 
(discussed above) to a cllent or hls 
lawyer, exist In every country where 
service by mall Is Improper or Illegal. 
6. The recent Schlunk case stated that 
U.S. law did not require, In every case, 
Hague Convention procedures to bring 
a foreign defendant Into a U.S. Court. 
However, the Court said these 
procedures could alway• be used; and 
a lawyer who didn't, ran the risk of 
finding out that he should have. 
Additionally, the Court stated that 
where treaty procedures were not used, 
a U.S. judgement could be unenforcible 
abroad. 
The actual effect of foreign 
laws, are that almost 90% of foreign 
defendants can avoid a U.S. Judgement 
In their country If treaty procedures are 
not followed. U.S. subsidiaries are 
generally thinly capitalized with limited 
resources. The Dalkon Shield cases 
have taught that ''deep pockets" have 
"bottoms." It Is obvious who will pay a 
Judgement, when a lawyer begins his 
case with a method of service which 
won't reach the foreign defendant's 
pocketbook. 
7. Informal Service occurs when service Is 
made by a private party placing the 
Summons & Complaint lnto the 
defendant's hands. Formal Service ls 
made pursuant to International treaty 
law or letters Rogatory and ts made In 
strict accordance with laws of foreign 
jurisdiction, Informal service Is 
generally much faster, requires no 
translation, but Is not allowed In every 
foreign country. 
8. Don't waste your valuable time trying to determine how to serve papers outside 
the United States. Let our foreign department handle your service of proce11 
abroad. APS 11 the only process serving company with a complete translation 
department and legal staff. We are now handling approximately 80" of 
documents going abroad. And our toll free number means It doesn't cost you a 
dime to get your questions answered . 
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that the government may not "neutral-
ly" reflect private prejudice. 
The case involved the removal of a 
child from the custody of her mother, a 
white woman, upon her remarriage to 
an Afiican American man. A unanimous 
Supreme Court held that it w:is improper 
to consider the race of the stepparent, 
even if race were relevant to predicting 
the difficulties the child would face.24 
Particularly when a court in a tort ac-
tion is faced with the odious task of clas-
sifying :i. plaintiff according to race- a 
siruation bound to occur with some fre-
quency in our muJtir.tcial society-it may 
be inclined to rule that the Constitution 
forbids reliance on race-based econom-
ic data. 
Requiring courts to use only inclusive, 
gender-neutral, and race-neutral statis-
tics to determine future income capaci-
ty would not raise the aggregate amount 
of tort damages awarded to plantifls. In-
stead, through the equalization process, 
women of all races would benefit, with 
the greatest reductions occurring in 
awards to white men. The awards wouJd 
be redistributed, but the overall amount 
of tort damages should not really change 
substantially. 
This change in the pattern of damage 
awards would nevertheless be f.lir because 
the value of a tort plaintiff's injury should 
not be tied to past disparities in the earn-
ings or labor force participation of men 
and women. Use of inclusive statistics 
goes beyond superficial neutrality because 
it talces the experience of all people into 
account in setting the norm and, in the 
process, eliminates both gender disad-
vantage and gender privilege. 
Using gender-based economic data to 
determine the future earning capacity of 
tort victims is one mechanism by which 
the lives of women are devalued while 
the appearance of neutrality and ratio-
nality is still preserved. I doubt whether 
most defense attorneys would openly ar-
gue today that women are domestic crea-
tures whose labor is not worthy of com-
pensation or capable of being evaluated 
in dollars and cents. Nevertheless, the 
potential of women continues to be de-
valued in a subtle way through gender-
based statistics. 
Practically, this deprives women of fair 
compensation for their injuries. Sym-
bolically, it signals that white men are 
worth more and reinforces the belief that 
white men will achieve more in their lives. 
Based on conventional equal protection 
analysis, the practice shouJd be declared 
unconstitutional. C 
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